Abstract
older assumptions have often been revisited. This is especially true of the issue of whether ministers of religion are employees, which has been the subject of two Supreme Court and two Court of Appeal judgments within a decade.
3 At first glance, this lack of attention seems appropriate. The question of whether ministers of religion are to be understood legally to be employees appears to be a dry, technical question of interest only to the parties affected and their ecclesiastical communities.
However, this first impression is misguided. This question actually raises the same basic tension found in newer topics that have excited Law and Religion academics. These include the 'minorities within minorities' debate about sharia law and the operation of religious tribunals as well as the cases concerning the clash of freedom of religion with other rights such as freedom of expression and the need not to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation. 4 Like these controversies, the question about the employment status of ministers boils down to a conflict between "secular" individual rights against the desire to preserve the autonomy of religious groups. This is perhaps most clearly articulated in the leading US decision on the matter.
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission 5 the US Supreme Court held that "the interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important.
But so too is the interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission". The Supreme Court endorsed the so-called "ministerial exception", holding that to treat ministers of religion as employees "interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs".
By contrast to Hosanna-Tabor, the UK case law on this topic has come to place more weight on the "secular" individual right for ministers of religion to enforce employment rights rather than upon the autonomy of religious groups to determine their own internal governance. It is commonly thought that this has been the collective effect of the four twenty-first century senior court decisions. This article, however, will argue that the novelty and importance of these cases has been overplayed and that they do not represent a change in the law. The legal position remains the same as it has been since the mid-twentieth century. It is the facts of the claims that have changed as a result of wider social change. It will be argued that the twentyfirst century judgments have misrepresented the twentieth century decisions in order to suggest that the legal position has been modernised. The article will begin by summarising the twentieth century case law before then looking at the four twenty-first century decisions.
In the final part of this article, the concept of a "judicial retcon" will be introduced and examined for the first time. It will be asked whether the twenty-first century case law's treatment of the earlier decisions represents a "judicial retcon" and it will be tentatively explored whether this concept can be used in order to shed further light upon judicial reasoning in a whole host of contexts. However, before reaching that point, it is necessary to substantiate the claim that the twenty-first century case law misrepresents the earlier history.
The Twentieth Century Case Law: The Contract Conundrum
The judgments in the twenty-first century cases make three general propositions that are false. The first was that it was formerly accepted that ministers of religion were not employees. 6 The second was that there was a presumption against there being an intention to create legal relations. 7 And the third was that the first twenty-first century case, Percy, 8 provided a "sea change" in terms of changing and modernising the legal position. 9 The first proposition was true only of the case law before the mid-twentieth century. In the early twentieth century, there is ample evidence of judges holding that clergy of the Church of England were not governed by the law of contract at all but were subject to ecclesiastical law. 10 Judges recognised that ministers of other faiths entered into a relationship which was pre-eminently of a religious character. 11 Judges began to articulate this by saying that the parties were "not intending to confer upon one another rights and obligations which are 6 See, e.g. held that a Methodist Church minister was not an employee. However, although the judgment spoke of the spiritual nature of the relationship between a minister and his church, attention was afforded to the facts of the agreement with emphasis being placed upon the fact that no wage was paid to ministers and that a minister cannot unilaterally resign from his ministry.
The legal rule had now become re-crafted in a way that opened the door to the possibility that ministers could be regarded as being employees. Dillon LJ stated that:
"the relationship between a church and a minister of religion is not apt, in the absence of clear indications of a contrary intention in the document, to be regulated by a contract of service".
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Subsequent cases made it clear that it was possible on the facts for a minister of religion to be an employee. However, on the facts of the cases before them, courts consistently held that no such contractual intention could be found. "it is possible for a man to be employed as a servant or as an independent contractor to carry out duties which are exclusively spiritual. But in the present case the applicant cannot point to any contract between himself and the church".
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However, although the elucidation of the legal rule in such decisions made it clear that the existence of a contract was a question of fact, dicta in these cases gave the impression that the religious nature of the minister's role was a factor that made it unlikely that he would be considered to be an employee. In Davies, for example, it was stated that the minister's "duties are defined and his activities are dictated not by contract but by conscience. He is the servant of God". Such statements, however, can be seen as obiter assertions, simplified summaries of the evidence considered by the courts, rather than a statement of law. The case law was clear that it was now possible for relations between a minister and his church to be contractual; the very question being considered was whether or not the facts supported such a conclusion.
A question mark remained, however, as to whether the religious nature of the minster's work made it less likely that a minister would be an employee.Dillon LJ's rule in Parfitt stated that "clear indications" of an intention "to be regulated by a contract of service" was required.
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This could be interpreted as evidence of the second proposition espoused in the twenty-first century case law there was a presumption against there being an intention to create legal relations in the case of ministers of religion. However, any talk of presumptions was absent from the case law until the late twentieth century. And, even then when judges framed the issue of the employment status of ministers in terms of the need for an intention to create legal relations, there was no talk of a presumption against such an intention. Those judicial utterances focused on the issue of whether there was a presumption for such an intention rather than saying that there was a presumption against. Coker, therefore, is authority for the proposition that there is no presumption for there being an intention to create legal relations in agreements between a minister and a religious body. It does not say that there is a presumption against there being an intention to create legal relations. The Court of Appeal simply said that an intention to create legal relations needs be proven before a contract will be recognised. There is no presumption either way. Yet, as we will see, the twenty-first century case law assumed that this was the law.
Percy: A Diluted Sea Change
On the surface, it would appear that the four senior court decisions on the employment status of ministers in the twenty-first century represent a changed and modernised legal approach that represents a shift towards the more common recognition of employment rights of ministers of religion. 26 Indeed, this is the impression that the judgments themselves perpetuate. Such a conclusion is also supported by the fact that ministers of religion have been successful in their claims in some (but by no means all) of these cases. However, these surface level impressions, though commonly held, are questionable. The fact that some ministers have been successful has invariably coloured the way in which the judgments are read and the way in which the cases are remembered and understood. The success of some claims in the twenty-first century has created an impression that the law has changed. 25 [1998] ICR 140 at 147. 26 The question of the employment status of ministers has also been further affected by a series of recent cases concerning the vicarious liability of religious groups for torts committed by those who work for them. While in some cases it has been conceded that ministers of religion should be treated as if they were employees for the purpose of vicarious liability (e.g. Reference to the judgments themselves, however, point to a different conclusion. The legal rules applied have not changed. Some claims are being successful now because the facts have changed. It is now more likely that a minister of religion will put their relationship with their religious body on a more formal written footing and that this can therefore be seen as being contractual. In other words, it is now more likely that there will be an intention to create legal relations. It is true that this is attributable in part to a changing legal context: an increase in the amount and reach of employment law provisions and a general juridification of aspects of social life which were previously considered to be private and outside the scope of the law. 27 However, the question of law that courts and tribunals apply to such cases has not changed. The test is still Dillon LJ's rule in Parfitt that "clear indications" of an intention "to be regulated by a contract of service" is required.
The first, and perhaps most influential, twenty-first century judgment was that of Percy v
Church of Scotland Board of National Mission
28 . This concerned a sex discrimination claim brought against the Church of Scotland by a former minister of the Church. The two main issues were whether Ms Percy's relationship with the Church constituted employment for the purposes of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and whether the claim constituted a "spiritual matter" under the Church of Scotland Act 1921 meaning that it was within the exclusive cognizance of the Church of Scotland and its own courts. 29 The relevant law differed in this case from the twentieth century decisions discussed above because before the House of Lords the claimant did not pursue her claim for wrongful dismissal, accepting that she had not entered into a contract of service. The claim was under discrimination law. Her case was that she was employed under a contract personally to execute certain work, that is, a contract for services as distinct from a contract of service.In the discrimination law context it has been understood that the contract for services is to be interpreted as being broader in meaning than the contract of service required to bring a claim for unfair dismissal. The House of Lords held that Percy as a minister of the Church of Scotland was an employee for the purposes of sex discrimination. In so doing, their Lordships clarified a point of law that had been of tangential importance in the earlier case law on employment ministers of religion and had been resolved in case law extending employment rights in other contexts. Lord Nicholls held that "holding an office and being an employee" was "not inconsistent": "A person may hold an "office" on the terms of, and pursuant to, a contract of employment".
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This was not, however, the focus of the Percy judgment. As with the late twentieth century case law, the focus was on whether there was an intention to create legal relations. Oddly, however, Lord Nicholls in his discussion of the case law presented this as being "a further strand" rather than being definitive. This is particularly curious given that the lower courts in Percy had relied a great deal on the presumption point. Indeed, the lower courts had suggested that there was a presumption against an intention to create legal relations in these cases. In the First Division decision Lord
Rodger had dismissed Percy's appeal on the basis of a "rebuttable presumption" that "where the appointment was being made to a recognised form of ministry within the Church and where the duties of that ministry would be essentially spiritual, there would be no intention that the arrangements made with the minister would give rise to obligations enforceable in the civil law". "But this principle should not be carried too far. It cannot be carried into arrangements which on their face are to be expected to give rise to legally-binding obligations. The offer and acceptance of a church post for a specific period, with specific provision for the appointee's duties and remuneration and travelling expenses and holidays and accommodation, seems to me to fall firmly within this latter
This is presented as a (partial) change in the legal position, the softening of a principle whereby it was presumed that there was no intention to create legal relations. However, not only is it questionable that such a presumption against ever existed, it is also true that the alleged softening of the principle is not itself new. The idea that "legally binding obligations" would exist if these facts were in place had been accepted since (at least) the late twentieth century case law. This is simply a re-articulation of Dillon LJ's rule in Parfitt that "clear It is true that there has been an increase in the quantity and reach of employment law and that this might mean that it is more likely that arrangements will be put on a contractual and therefore legal footing. And that this has meant that there are probably higher expectations now that employment provisions will apply to a wider range of workers. However, the fact remains that Lord Nicholl's speech in Percy did not actually alter the legal rule. The question remains whether there is an intention to create legal relations. Ironically, Lord Nicholls' judgment actually moves the law slightly away from the recognition of employment rights since, unlike the twentieth century cases, he stated that the presumption against intention to create legal relations "may have a place".The same point can be made of his further comment that the presumption against "should not be carried too far". Lord Nicholl's speech suggested that in some cases there will be a rebuttable presumption against an intention to create legal relations but that this should not be often applied. This is likely at the very least to complicate and confuse the matter. Indeed, this can be seen in Baroness Hale's judgment where she held that:
"I too find it impossible to conclude that there was no intent to enter into legal relations. ... I have difficulty in understanding why there should be any presumption against such an intention".
39
The reason for Baroness Hale's difficulty is that there was never any such presumption against such an intention! Percy also undermined earlier obiter comments about 38 Para26. 39 Para 148.
characteristics of religious ministry that make it unlikely that there is an intention to create legal relations. Most notably, Lord Hoffmann held that to say "that a priest is "the servant of God' is true for a believer but superfluous metaphor for a lawyer". 40 The Percy judgment as a whole underscored that the question of whether a minister of religion was to be an employee depended on the facts and whether those facts provided the evidence for such a contract.
However, this was not a novel approach. This had been the position from at least the late twentieth century cases onwards. The decision in Percy (that she was an employee for the purpose of sex discrimination) and its move away from some of the expressions used at the end of the twentieth century was novel. However, the dicta on the intention to create legal relations were not new and were in part retrogressive. And the fact that the claim concerned the wider definition of contract for services under sex discrimination law rather than the narrower contract of service required to bring a claim for unfair dismissal led to confusion as to how much weight should be given to the decision anyway in terms of precedent. The lack of clarity provided by the House of Lords judgment led to a further three senior court decisions in quick succession all of which perpetuated the myth that there had previously been a presumption against an intention to create legal relations and that Percy represented a significant legal change.
Stewart, Preston and Sharpe: Blurring the Lines
The Court of Appeal in New Testament Church of God v Stewart 41 held that a minister of religion was an employee under unfair dismissal law, confirming and applying Percy.
However, the judgment perpetuated a number of representations about the twentieth century cases and about Percy which were suspect. Pill LJ held that, whilst courts had previously "been reluctant to find that a contract of employment exists", it had been argued before the 46 The case was also important since the Church appealed citing their rights under Article 9 ECHR (which had not been argued in Percy). Pill LJ held that Article 9 requires that respect be given to the faith and doctrine of the particular church, which may run counter to there being a relationship enforceable at law between the priest, curate or minister and the Church. The law should not readily impose a legal relationship on members of a religious community which would be contrary to their religious beliefs. Employment tribunals should carefully analyse the particular facts, which will vary from church to church, and probably from religion to religion, before reaching a conclusion (para 55). 47 [2013] UKSC 29. 48 Apart from its location and name, the new Supreme Court does not differ substantially from the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, the body which it replaced.
49.
The claimant's surname was Moore when proceedings began, she subsequently married. "There is now a substantial body of authority on the point, much of it influenced by relatively inflexible tests borne of social instincts which came more readily to judges of an earlier generation than they do in the more secular and regulated context of today. Until recently, ministers of religion were generally held not to be employees."
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No explanation was put forward by his Lordship for why the tests were "relatively inflexible". Indeed, the tests as applied in Percy and Stewart were exactly the same as had been applied in the late twentieth century cases. They were necessarily "tests borne of social instincts" since the question before judges and employment chairs was, and is, a question of fact. The question is whether there was an intention to create legal relations and evidence to support the claim that the agreement between the minister and the religious body constituted a contract of employment.
Lord Sumption held that: "Two recurrent themes can be found in the case law". 54 The first was "the distinction between an office and an employment" while the second "theme is a tendency to regard the spiritual nature of a minister of religion's calling as making it unnecessary and inappropriate to characterise the relationship with the church as giving rise to legal relations at all". 55 Curiously, Lord Sumption then conflated these two themes. In his discussion of the distinction between an office and an employment he asserted that Coker held that the minister's "duties were derived from his priestly status and not from any 50. (1983) They all took what Lord Sumption referred to as the "correct approach" which "is to examine the rules and practices of the particular church and any special arrangements made with the particular minister".
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Moreover, Lord Sumption's speech raised further questions about how progressive the Percy judgment was. He held that:
"The decision in Percy is authority for the proposition that the spiritual character of the ministry did not give rise to a presumption against the contractual intention. But the majority did not suggest that the spiritual character of the ministry was irrelevant".
Percy may well be authority for that proposition but that proposition is meaningless if there was never any such presumption against an intention to create legal relations. Moreover, as
Lord Sumption noted, Percy had not created a presumption for an intentionto create legal relations. Indeed questions remained as to the extent to which the "spiritual character of ministry". This sowed the seeds for further confusion and even more litigation leading to another Court of Appeal decision on the same point of law, the decision in Sharpe v Bishop of Worcester 63 .The Court of Appeal decision in Sharpe perpetuated the same perceptions as the other twenty-first century decisions. Arden LJ held that:
"Not long ago, no one entertained the idea that, at least in a church where individual churches are subject to an overarching organisation, a minister of religion could be an employee of the religious organisation for which he worked. Several reasons were given for this: that the duties of office were spiritual or that the minister held an office (and that holding of an office was exclusive of employment) or that there was a presumption that the parties did not intend to create legal relations or that the duties were prescribed by the special institutional framework of religious law. Slowly but surely, as a brief description of the major cases that follows will show, some of these reasons have been displaced. The law has developed and changed because it was difficult to justify the exclusion of ministers of religion from the benefit of modern employment protection legislation. I would go so far as to say that there is now no rule which applies only to ministers which does not also apply to other persons who claim to be employees although of course the facts to which the law has to be applied are very different. It is the same principles which have to be applied."
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It is difficult to know where to begin in terms of correcting this interpretation. The existence of the case law suggests that the idea that ministers of religion could be employees has been "entertained" for a great deal of time. Arden LJ was correct to approve submissions that it would not be determinative that ministers have a spiritual function, are office-holders or are governed by ecclesiastical law. 65 However, all of these submissions were by no means new.
At times the Court of Appeal was simply stating that the law was not as it had been a century before. That the Court of Appeal deemed it necessary to state principles that had already been articulated in recent years by three senior court decisions is troubling. The Court of Appeal was also correct to state that the cases concerning ministers of religion would be fact specific. However, again, it has long been the case that the "facts must be looked at in the individual case and in the round".
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Despite the way in which the twenty-first judgments themselves present the case law, it is questionable whether these four decisions on points of law before senior courts have actually resulted in any changes to the interpretation of those points of law. Dillon LJ's rule in Parfitt, that "clear indications" of an intention "to be regulated by a contract of service" was required, remains good law. The question of whether ministers of religion are employees remains a question of fact. In Sharpe Arden LJ held that: "In a situation where the shadows of history and tradition are as long as they are here, the court has to be sure that the form does not obscure the present day substance". 67 Ironically, however, in Sharpe and the other twentyfirst century cases, it was the court that was obscuring the picture, misusing and misrepresenting the history in order to perpetuate a particular story which conflated and exaggerated the extent of legal change.
Conclusion: A Judicial Retcon?
The turning point, perhaps, was Lord Rodger's judgment in the First Division decision in
Percy in which he spoke of a "rebuttable presumption" deriving from Coker that "there would be no intention that the arrangements made with the minister would give rise to obligations enforceable in the civil law". 68 From then on, Coker was understood as authority that there was a presumption against an intention to create legal relations (rather than that there was no presumption for such an intention). It would be possible, therefore, to understand the twenty-first century cases as simply correcting a mistaken interpretation of
Coker. The twenty-first century cases could therefore be seen as bringing the law back in line albeit within a different social context where it would be more likely as a question of fact that an intention to create legal relations would have existed.
However, this understanding of the twenty-first century judgments is too charitable. The selective way in which the twentieth century cases are presented, the way in which those judgments are caricatured as antiquated, inflexible and erroneous, undermines any attempt to regard their misinterpretation as a mere mistake. 69 Rather, the presentation of the twentieth century case law in the twenty-first century judgments must be seen as a deliberate attempt to explain the difference in outcome by contrasting it with the earlier case law. Rather than just accepting that these claims were factually different (and that the changed facts may be in part attributable generally to a changed legal environment), judges in the twenty-first century cases spoke of a "sea change". They spoke of a move way from a presumption against an intention to create legal relations (which had never existed) and claimed that they were bringing about a change in the interpretation of the law to reflect changing social norms. It may be that this case law is not exceptional and that these habits, these rhetorical devices, are commonplace in judicial decisions. The emphasis of originality, the sharp distinction between the present and the historical practice and the faint but noticeable aroma of progress may well be techniques that are subconsciously part of the toolkit of adjudicators. Clarke defines presentism as "a privileging of the present" and writes that "presentism in popular culture involves the reversion to a more restricted mental world" whereby the phrase "that's old" no longer means "that originated some time ago" but means "that is vexatious" and "that's history no longer means that is important because it has made us what we are" but means "that is laughably irrelevant to us": J Clark, Our Shadowed Present (Atlantic Books, 2003) 2, 7. Law Schools because of its inherently subversive nature. Legal History shows that the law and legal institutions are not fixed, that every line drawn in the law and everything the law holds as sacred is arbitrary and that the environment that students are socialised into is a historical construct. This subversive nature of Legal History was recognised in a letter by Maitland recognising that a historical approach to law teaches "the lesson that each generation has an enormous power of shaping its own law" and that the study of Legal History "would free them from superstitions and teach them that they have free hands".
76 The concept of a "Judicial Retcon" is offered, therefore, not only as a means of critiquing (and correcting) the historical illiteracy of judges (as part of a wider critique of "presentism") but also as an example of a tool that can form part of a subversive Legal History. This would use the past not only to understand but also to critique the present, to undermine what is taken for granted and to suggest different approaches including those which are not contaminated evolutionary assumptions of progress.
The term "retcon" is an abbreviation of the phrase "retroactive continuity", used to describe a literary device whereby new information is retrospectively added which re-sets the established continuity of a fictional work. The term is thought to have been first used by
Frank Tupper in his translation and discussion of the work of Wolfhart Pannenberg. 77 The term is used there to translate Pannenberg's notion that it is later events that prescribe and dictate the canon of history. As Tupper puts it, this means that the "continuity of events is actually visible only in retrospect. Pannenberg's conception of retroactive continuity ultimately means that history flows fundamentally from the future into the past". 78 Moreover:
"The continuity of history, therefore, does not exist primarily as evolution but must be established retroactively. So the contingency of events which redefines the succession of events converges with a "retroactive continuity'".
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This notion that the continuity has been retroactively reconstructed is now the accepted meaning of the term "retcon". Today, "retcon" is often used in literary criticism and particularly in relation to science fiction to describe the altering of a previously established history within a fictional work. It is a form of "rewriting history" in the Orwellian sense of the term; a way in which the present controls the past, resetting it to fit its own agenda. 80 The device seems particularly appropriate and necessary in the "post truth" age of "fake news"and "alternative facts". To date, however, talk of a "retcon" has not been used in relation to law.
There is considerable scope for such an application if law is understood as literature and if judicial decisions are seen as creative interpretative actions which reflect not only the culture of the legal system (or parts thereof) but also the identity of the author. Historical summaries are common place in legal judgments, though they are not often identified as so. Every summary of the facts and every summary of the case law is a historical interpretation. And such accounts do not occur in a vacuum. They are shaped by the judge's understanding of the world and also the needs (both explicit and implicit) of the legal system. Judgments may therefore on occasion feature a "retconned" interpretation of history -a "judicial retcon" -that misrepresents the past and rewrites history to fit the "story" of the law that the judge wants to give.
Identifying judicial retcons where they occur can be valuable but the more important question is to ask why such a retcon has been made; what functions the retcon serves. Historical analysis is concerned with the complex relationship between continuity and change. A judicial retcon can be used either to stress continuity -by suggesting an imagined precursor for an actual innovation -or to emphasise change-by over-stating the novelty of a development and either forgetting about precedents or presenting them as being of limited value. The retcons identified above in the examination of the case law on the employment status of ministers of religion fall into this second category. To explain the change in outcome, twenty-first century judges have misrepresented and simplified the judgments of their twentieth century predecessors. This has resulted in bad history and confusion as shown by the sheer number of senior court decisions. This may be seen as symptomatic of a wider ill-ease which has characterised the manner in which domestic judges have dealt with the twenty-first century expansion of religious rights. 81 As in that wider context, judicial manoeuvring has shifted the focus to be on technical legal issues rather than broader more controversial social and political issues. The basic issue raised by these cases, the tension 80 Orwell explored this in Nineteen Eighty-Four: "if all others accepted the lie which the Party imposed -if all records told the same tale -then the lie passed into history and became truth. "Who controls the past", ran the Party slogan, "controls the future: who controls the present controls the past". ... All that was needed was an unending series of victories over your own memory. "Reality control", they called it": G Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (Penguin, 2000 [1949 ) 40. 81 On which see R Sandberg, Religion, Law and Society (Cambridge University Press, 2014).
between enforcing "secular" individual rights against the desire to protect the autonomy of religious groups, has been sidestepped.
By their nature, the senior court judgments have focused on articulating points of law. This has been less than helpful given that these points of law have been re-articulated rather than articulated and also, more importantly, because this is an area which is very fact-specific. In other contexts concerning contractual rights that have a social rather than commercial contexts, 82 the benefits of relational contract theory has been explored. 
